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Abstract
We find a resonance behavior in the disturbance when an eavesdropper chooses a near-optimal
strategy intentionally or unintentionally when the usual Bennett-Brassard cryptographic scheme is
performed between two trusted parties. This phenomenon tends to disappear when eavesdropping
strategy moves far from the optimal one. Therefore, we conjecture that this resonant effect is a
characteristic for the eavesdropping strategy near to optimal one. We argue that this effect makes
the quantum cryptography more secure against the eavesdropper’s attack.
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Recently, there are a lot of activities in the various applications of the quantum informa-
tion theories[1]. Among them the most important ones are application to quantum computer
and quantum cryptography. While the physical realization of the quantum computer seems
to be far from the embodiment in a few years, developing quantum cryptography based on
the BB84[2] and Ekert91[3] protocols is at the stage of the industrial era[4].
The main issue of the quantum cryptography is to determine how secure the quantum
cryptographic scheme compared to the classical scheme. This issue can be turned into the
following question: how much information the eavesdropper (Eve) can gain when a secret
key is established between two trusted parties(Alice and Bob)?
Of course, the answer of the question is dependent on the eavesdropping strategies. The
authors in Ref.[5, 6] computed the optimal mutual information between Alice and Eve in
the usual BB84 protocol and the final results are
Ixy =
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]
Iuv =
1
2
φ
[
2
√
Dxy(1−Dxy)
]
, (1)
where φ(z) = (1+ z) log2(1+ z)+(1− z) log2(1− z) and the subscripts denote the conjugate
basis Alice and Bob use during BB84 process. The disturbance D is Bob’s observable error
rate.
Subsequently, the BB84 protocol has been extended to the case that Alice and Bob use the
three conjugate bases[7]. It has been shown that this extended scheme is more secure against
the optimal eavesdropping. In order to find more secure quantum cryptographic protocols,
recently, much attention is paid to the qutrit[8, 9], qudit[9, 10, 11] and continuous-variable
systems[12]. The optimal eavesdropping on noisy states is also fully discussed very recently
in Ref.[13].
Instead of the optimal eavesdropping strategy we would like to discuss, in this letter,
on the near-optimal eavesdropping in usual BB84 scenario. We will show that an inter-
esting quantum resonance occurs in the disturbance between Alice and Bob when Eve’s
eavesdropping strategy is near to optimal.
First, we consider a simple case that Eve uses one-qubit probe. Eve makes contact her
probe with the qubit between Alice and Bob and gets her probe to be entangled. We restrict
ourselves into the case when Alice chooses x− y basis with notation |x〉 ≡ |0〉 and |y〉 ≡ |1〉.
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We choose the entangled states as following
|x〉 → |X〉 = a|00〉+ b|11〉
|y〉 → |Y 〉 = δ (−b|00〉+ a|11〉) +√1− δ2 (c|10〉+ d|01〉)
(2)
with a2 + b2 = c2 + d2 = 1.
According to BB84 scenario, Alice will announce bases which she used to establish a
secret key through public channel. After the announcement Eve performs an appropriate
quantum-mechanical measurement on her probe to gain information on the Alice’s qubit. In
order to maximize the information gain one can show that Eve takes a POVM measurement
with complete set of positive operators {E0 = |E0〉〈E0|, E1 = |E1〉〈E1|}, where[14]
|E0〉 = − 1√
2
ǫ(ac− bd)
√
1 + cosϕ|0〉+ 1√
2
√
1− cosϕ|1〉 (3)
|E1〉 = 1√
2
√
1− cosϕ|0〉+ 1√
2
ǫ(ac− bd)
√
1 + cosϕ|1〉.
In Eq.(3) ǫ(x) = x/|x| is usual alternating function and
cosϕ =
α√
α2 + β2
(4)
with α = (a2 − c2) − δ2(b2 − c2) and β = δ√1− δ2(ac− bd). Then, following Ref. [5], it is
straightforward to compute the Eve’s average information gain G:
G = q0G0 + q1G1 (5)
where
q0 =
1
2
+
1
4
(1− δ2)(a2 − b2 + c2 − d2) cosϕ− 1
2
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1− δ2|ac− bd| sinϕ (6)
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4q0
∣∣∣∣ {(a2 − b2 − c2 + d2) + δ2(a2 − b2 + c2 − d2)} cosϕ+ 2δ
√
1− δ2|ac− bd| sinϕ
∣∣∣∣
G1 =
1
4q1
∣∣∣∣ {(a2 − b2 − c2 + d2) + δ2(a2 − b2 + c2 − d2)} cosϕ+ 2δ
√
1− δ2|ac− bd| sinϕ
∣∣∣∣.
Using Eq.(6) one can compute the mutual information between Alice and Eve, which is
IAE = 1
2
[q0φ(G0) + q1φ(G1)] (7)
where φ(z) = (1 + z) log2(1 + z) + (1− z) log2(1− z).
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Now, let us discuss on the Bob’s error rate DB, which is usually called disturbance.
Firstly, let us consider dλu (or dλv), which is the probability that Bob gets a wrong result
conditioned upon Alice sending |u〉 (or |v〉) and Eve measuring λ, where |u〉 = (|x〉+ |y〉)/√2
and |v〉 = (|x〉 − |y〉)/√2. Then, it is easy to show
dλu = 1− 〈U |(|u〉〈u|)⊗ Eλ|U〉〈U |1 ⊗Eλ|U〉 dλv = 1−
〈V |(|v〉〈v|)⊗Eλ|V 〉
〈V |1 ⊗ Eλ|V 〉 (8)
where |U〉 = (|X〉 + |Y 〉)/√2 and |V 〉 = (|X〉 − |Y 〉)/√2. If Eve has chosen the optimal
strategy ab initio, dλu and dλv should coincide with each other. Since, however, we are
considering the non-optimal case, we cannot expect dλu = dλv in general. Although it is
straightforward to compute dλu and dλv, we will not present the explicit expressions in this
letter due to their lengthy expressions. As expected, dλu is different from dλv except δ = 0
case.
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FIG. 1: The plot of D-dependence of the mutual information between Alice and Eve when δ = 0
and a = 0.01. Because of the fact that dλ is dependent on λ, the mutual information for the δ = 0
case is slightly smaller than that for the optimal case.
We would like to discuss the δ = 0 case briefly. In this case the most optimal conditions
derived in Ref.[5] are satisfied. The only one this case does not satisfy is the fact that
dλ ≡ dλu = dλv is dependent on λ. This fact makes the mutual information IAE(δ = 0)
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to be slightly smaller than the optimal value Eq.(1) as shown in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1 the
disturbance D is defined as an average Bob’s error rate
D =
∑
λ
qλdλ =
1
2
(1− ac− bd). (9)
Since the δ = 0 case does satisfy the almost optimal conditions, we guess that the mutual
information IAE for this case is maximum on condition that Eve uses the single-qubit probe.
Now let us consider the δ 6= 0 case. Since, in this case, dλu is different from dλv, we should
define the disturbance as
D = puDu + pvDv (10)
where pi’s are the prior probabilities that Alice sends signal i, and
Du ≡
∑
λ
qλdλu Dv ≡
∑
λ
qλdλv. (11)
In this letter we take a reasonable assumption that the two signals are equiprobable, i.e.
pu = pv = 1/2.
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FIG. 2: The c-dependence of D when δ = 0.05 and a = 0.5. Fig. 2 implies that there exists a
resonance-like phenomenon in the Bob’s error rate when Eve chooses the near-optimal eavesdrop-
ping strategy. The two peaks in the figure are originated from Du and Dv respectively.
Fig. 2 is a c-dependence of D when δ = 0.05 and a = 0.5. Fig. 2 shows that there exist
two sharp peaks, which looks like a resonance phenomenon. The left and right peaks are
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originated fromDv andDu respectively. The reason why the peaks appear in the disturbance
can be explained as follows. Under some circumstances the numerator 〈U |(|u〉〈u|⊗Eλ) |U〉
is slightly smaller than the denominator 〈U |1 ⊗Eλ|U〉 in dλu in the wide range of parameter
space. Thus, dλu becomes very small in this region. If however, there are some points where
the numerator 〈U |(|u〉〈u|⊗Eλ) |U〉 approaches zero, this makes a sharp increase at these
points even if the denominator 〈U |1 ⊗Eλ|U〉 is slightly larger than the numerator. Similar
phenomenon can occurs for dλv, which gives different peak.
Numerical calculation shows that these sharp peaks disappear when δ increases. This fact
makes us to conjecture that this resonance-like phenomenon happens in the near-optimal
strategy because the δ = 0 case can play a role as an optimal strategy on condition that
Eve uses a single-qubit probe.
In order to check the validity of our conjecture let us consider the case that Eve chooses
the near-optimal strategy with her two-qubit probe. We assume that entanglement between
Alice’s and Eve’s qubits is given by
|X〉 = √s|x〉|ξx〉+
√
1− s|y〉|ζx〉 (12)
|Y 〉 = √s|y〉
[√
1− δ2|ξy〉+ δ
(
−
√
1− β|Ψ+xy〉+
√
β|Ψ−xy〉
)]
+
√
1− s|x〉
[√
1− δ2|ζy〉+ δ
(−√1− α|Φ+xy〉+√α|Φ−xy〉)
]
where
|ξx〉 =
√
α|Φ+xy〉+
√
1− α|Φ−xy〉 |ξy〉 =
√
α|Φ+xy〉 −
√
1− α|Φ−xy〉 (13)
|ζx〉 =
√
β|Ψ+xy〉 −
√
1− β|Ψ−xy〉 |ζy〉 =
√
β|Ψ+xy〉+
√
1− β|Ψ−xy〉.
The states |Φ±xy〉 and |Ψ±xy〉 denote the maximally entangled Bell basis as follows:
|Φ±xy〉 =
1√
2
(|x〉|x〉 ± |y〉|y〉) |Ψ±xy〉 =
1√
2
(|x〉|y〉 ± |y〉|x〉) . (14)
The reason why we choose Eq.(12) is that the entangled states |X〉 and |Y 〉 with δ = 0
provides an optimal mutual information to Eve as shown in Ref.[5]. Thus, we want to find
a resonance phenomenon when δ is small to check the validity of our guess.
The disturbance D can be computed numerically by making use of the symbolic calcu-
lation. Fig. 3 is a plot of α-dependence of D when β = 1.8 − α, s = 0.5 and δ = 0.05.
As expected the disturbance D exhibits a resonance behavior with varying α. This phe-
nomenon tends to disappear with increasing δ. Thus, this resonant behavior seems to be a
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FIG. 3: The α-dependence of the disturbance D when Eve uses the entanglement Eq.(12). The
other constants are fixed by β = 1.8 − α, s = 0.5 and δ = 0.05. As expected the disturbance
D exhibits a sharp resonance. This effect disappears with increasing δ, which means that Eve’s
eavesdropping strategy is far from optimal one. Thus, this resonance seems to occur in the near-
optimal strategy.
characteristic for the near-optimal eavesdropping strategy. Unlike Fig. 2, Fig. 3 shows one
peak. This is due to the fact that Du and Dv have peaks at the same point.
In this letter we report on the resonance phenomenon in the disturbance when Eve chooses
the near-optimal eavesdropping strategy. In reality eavesdropper cannot perform the exact
optimal strategy due to the various nature’s non-linear and/or decoherence effects. If eaves-
dropper takes an near-optimal strategy, this resonance effect increases a possibility for the
two trusted parties to realize the eavesdropping attack. As a result, the resonance discussed
in this letter makes the quantum cryptography more and more secure. It is of highly im-
portant, in this reason, to verify this resonance phenomenon in the quantum cryptographic
experiment.
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